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3of the reconciliation programme together with state-
sponsored development projects such as Vision 2020 
that seek to transform Rwanda into a ‘haven and a 
hub’ for donors and foreign investors.5 Both political 
images have serious implications for human rights 
and development as in effect they restrict the political 
landscape, silence criticism from opponents and 
promote uneven development.
Political images at home
At the national level, official reconciliation functions 
as an umbrella programme under which a wide variety 
of policies and projects are grouped together and 
administered in a strictly top-down manner. These 
programmes include decentralisation; civic education; 
Gacaca community genocide courts;6 repatriation and 
re-integration of refugees and ex-combatants; and 
development. The national reconciliation programme 
constructs a political image of Rwanda as a safe, 
stable and prosperous nation in three ways. The first 
protects the singular narrative of Rwandan history, 
the civil war and genocide disseminated by the RPF 
government, a narrative that focuses primarily on the 
stratification of ethnic groups by colonial leaders; the 
detrimental effects of bad governance in the run-up to 
the genocide; and the danger of continued genocide 
ideology and divisionism in Rwanda. Thousands of 
participants – including students entering university, 
demobilising ex-combatants and genocide perpetrators 
– are taught this narrative at mandatory live-in ingando 
solidarity education camps run by the government.7 
Itorero ry’igihugu civic education camps also teach this 
version of Rwandan history with an emphasis on social 
and cultural values and the importance of development. 
Gacaca genocide courts play an important role in 
preserving this narrative as they protect the RPF from 
Reconciliation in Rwanda
Rwanda was welcomed as the newest member of the 
Commonwealth on 29 November 2009 with President 
Paul Kagame greeting warmly Rwanda’s acceptance 
into this ‘unique and diverse family, with whom similar 
values and aspirations are shared’, at the formal 
acceptance ceremony in March 2010.1 The values he 
spoke of include democracy, freedom, peace, rule of law 
and equal rights.2 
Rwanda’s newly granted membership of the 
Commonwealth is but one recent example of the 
nation’s growth and change in the post-genocide 
period, a transition guided by the Rwandan Patriotic 
Front (RPF) and President Kagame.3 The RPF came 
to power under the guise of the transitional Government 
of National Unity (GNU) after successfully seizing the 
capital Kigali in July 1994. The party expanded its 
political control through the parliamentary election of 
2008 and the presidential elections of 2003 and 2010. 
From the late 1990s, the RPF devised and implemented 
a national unity and reconciliation programme with the 
stated mandate of fighting divisionism, building the 
nation and preventing the recurrence of genocide.4   
The national reconciliation programme functions as 
a normative and legal framework through which the 
government constructs two distinct, yet inter-related, 
political images of Rwanda. The first of these images 
is disseminated to the domestic audience of Rwandan 
citizens, primarily shaped by the government’s projection 
of Rwanda as a safe, stable and prosperous nation for 
all members of society. The second constructed image 
of the nation is projected to the international community 
of donors and foreign investors. This image is fashioned 
by donor and NGO participation in the construction 
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4that the government began reporting cases of genocide 
ideology much earlier than 2008 and that they were 
prosecuted in relation to an earlier law pertaining to 
the punishment of sectarianism and discrimination that 
came into effect in 2002.16 Accusations of genocide 
ideology were made against high-profile members of 
opposition parties including Victoire Ingabire, leader of 
FDU-Inkingi, who attempted to register for the 2010 
Rwandan Presidential election. Ingabire was charged 
with genocide ideology, minimising the genocide and 
collaborating with a terrorist group.17 Accusations of 
genocide ideology were also made against Bernard 
Ntaganda, the leader of opposition party PS-Imberakuri. 
Ntaganda began his four-year sentence on 11 February 
2011 for crimes of divisionism including publicly 
criticising the government in speeches, breaching 
state security and attempting to plan an ‘unauthorised 
demonstration’.18  
Thirdly, the reconciliation programme projects an image 
of stability and prosperity by legitimising government 
interests and policies, particularly those related to 
development. Leonard Rugwabiza, Director General 
of National Development Planning and Research 
at the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 
(MINECOFIN), asserts that the unity promoted by 
development programming such as Vision 2020 
benefits the population in two ways. The first provides 
citizens, who were once divided by ethnicity or their 
experiences of the genocide, with the opportunity to 
work together,19 which may be created through collective 
experience in private development projects or through 
government-sponsored programming. The latter set of 
projects includes development schemes that fall within 
the national reconciliation programme. Development 
programming also benefits ordinary Rwandese by 
stimulating individual and national pride. Rugwabiza 
contends that success in development makes civilians 
proud and brings them together. This experience yields 
such positive results that people, ‘see development and 
start to forget the division’,20 a quotation illustrating 
the rhetorical use of unity and reconciliation to push 
forward goals related to development. Rwanda Vision 
2020, published in 2000, outlines the RPF’s stated 
commitment to transforming Rwanda into a middle-
income country by 2020 and to building a nation that 
is both united and competitive in regional and global 
markets.21 While strong in national pride, this form of 
rapid development fails to benefit the nation evenly.
prosecution for crimes committed between 1990 and 
1994.  The legal parameters of the court are limited to 
offences constituting the crime of genocide and crimes 
against humanity,8 and the RPF vehemently denies 
having committed crimes of either type.9 Violations of 
international humanitarian law, allegedly committed by 
the RPF, cannot be tried at the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) as the RPF has actively 
obstructed the tribunal’s investigations into crimes it 
may have committed.10
Secondly, the national reconciliation programme 
promotes a favourable image of the nation and its 
leadership by restricting perceived criticism of its 
programmes and the government. Moreover, it restricts 
political opposition, dissenting viewpoints of civilians 
and domestic NGOs and limits freedom of the press 
in Rwanda. Independent media have faced increased 
restrictions since the run-up to the presidential 
elections in August 2010. Reporters Without Borders 
cited the suspension of some 30 radio stations and 
news publications in the week before the elections 
for failing to register.11 On 5 February 2011, opinion 
pieces published in Umurabyo newspaper prior to 
the election led to the imprisonment of its editor and 
deputy editor (Agnes Nkusi Uwimana and Saidati 
Mukakibibi respectively). Uwimana was found guilty 
of genocide ideology, divisionism and defamation 
and sentenced to 17 years while Mukabibi received a 
seven-year prison term for threatening state security.12 
The Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI) 
highlighted press restrictions, among other concerns, in 
its 2009 assessment of Rwanda’s application to join the 
Commonwealth,13 arguing that the ‘monopolistic role of 
the state’ in constructing and disseminating Rwandan 
history and restricting the rights of free speech, 
expression and media impeded democracy.14  
At the centre of constraints upon free speech, 
association and democracy is the stated commitment to 
eradicate all forms of divisionism and genocide ideology. 
This commitment is guided by Law no. 18/2008 of 
23/07/2008 relating to the Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide Ideology,15 a law punishing thoughts 
and actions the accuser perceives as promoting the 
extermination of people according to their membership 
in groups based upon nationality, religion, sexuality or 
political opinion among others. Lars Waldorf contends 
5The RPF uses the notion of genocide credit to reproach 
criticism of the regime by laying partial blame for the 
genocide upon the international community. President 
Kagame did exactly this during the 15th Commemoration 
of the Genocide against the Tutsi on 7 April 2009: ‘Well, 
there are people who are guilty, no question. Those 
who abandoned people they had come here to protect 
and left them to be murdered, left them to the dogs … 
aren’t they guilty?’33 More recently, the current regime 
used the UN’s failure to intervene during the genocide 
to discredit the Report of the Mapping Exercise. This 
report documents serious violations of human rights 
and international humanitarian law in DRC, allegedly 
committed by the military branch of the RPF between 
March 1993 and June 2003.34
Amidst these tensions, the RPF’s role in the post-
genocide reconstruction of Rwanda has garnered 
the government ‘exceptional status’ from donors.35 In 
the development context, the RPF has constructed 
a positive image of itself portrayed through its stated 
commitment to high standards of ‘technocratic 
governance’.36 The RPF has paid particular attention 
to fostering a pro-business environment for the benefit 
of investors interested in Rwanda’s development: ‘We 
are painstakingly building the confidence of domestic 
and foreign investors to put their money into our hotels, 
energy projects, agriculture, the construction industry, 
and ICT on the basis of transparent government and 
predictability’.37 
The RPF’s high standards of technocratic governance 
have thus far translated into development that is 
primarily uneven. Uneven development is defined 
here as the inequitable distribution of the benefits to 
citizens of ‘intentional development’ (international aid; 
direct foreign investment; and the implementation of 
development projects, policies and programmes).38 
Development in Rwanda has been particularly uneven 
with regard to the least advantaged. For instance, 
there has been a negative impact on the commitment 
to promote ‘pro-poor growth’ (as stated in Vision 2020) 
due to land scarcity, enhanced opportunities for larger 
commercial farms and institutional constraints facing 
peasant farmers.39 The RPF is primarily responsible 
for the creation and implementation of development 
strategies but, as Eugenia Zorbas argues, the RPF 
development strategy, ‘does not fundamentally improve 
Political images abroad
The RPF’s emphasis on development promotes a ‘pro-
business environment’ carefully designed to appeal 
to an international audience of foreign donors and 
investors.22 Reconciliation’s primary function within 
the construction and dissemination of this image is to 
portray Rwanda as an attractive place to invest. Vision 
2020 asserts, ‘Without successful reconciliation, 
political stability and security, private investors will not 
develop confidence in the country’.23  
International governmental, non-governmental and 
multilateral organisations have played an important 
role in funding, supporting and monitoring the national 
reconciliation programme. The early post-genocide 
period saw a major upsurge in aid sent to Rwanda by 
international donors.24 A significant proportion of aid 
was given to programmes to promote reconciliation and 
justice. For instance, donors allotted money to the ICTR, 
the domestic legal system and Gacaca.25 The latter 
received funding and institutional support from a variety 
of governmental donors from America, Canada, France, 
Norway and Switzerland. Multilateral organisations, 
such as the EU, UN Development Programme (UNDP) 
and UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), also contributed.26 
Donors made a pledge of $600 USD in bilateral and 
multilateral aid in January 1995. Filip Reyntjens 
clarifies that this pledge was made without any form of 
conditionality related to the improvement of Rwanda’s 
‘rapidly deteriorating human rights situation’27 and 
describes that absence of conditionality as evidence of 
a trend towards granting Rwanda leeway in the context 
of post-conflict reconstruction as well as providing proof 
to the RPF that it can act with impunity.28
The international community’s support of reconciliation 
follows its failure to intervene adequately, prevent 
or end the genocide, an issue that has impacted the 
power dynamics between the government and donor 
community since 1994. The RPF has purportedly used 
‘genocide credit’ to manipulate the guilt and humiliation 
supposedly felt by the international community in several 
different ways,29 the major one being to mute criticism 
or what Johan Pottier refers to as ‘awkward questions’ 
from outsiders.30 These questions include: what role 
did the RPF play in civilian deaths during the genocide 
period and in the post-conflict era in Eastern Zaire, now 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)?31 32
6Conclusion
The RPF’s stated commitment to the promotion of 
unity and reconciliation obscures issues of impunity, 
restricted freedom of press and accusations of 
genocide ideology against political opponents. The 
promotion of uneven development is equally concealed 
by the government’s high standards of technocratic 
governance and the projection of the nation as a stable 
and prosperous place to invest. If the Commonwealth is 
indeed committed to the values of democracy, freedom 
and equal rights, it ought to look beyond the veneer of 
unity and reconciliation to consider the ways in which 
government programming infringes upon human rights 
and democracy. The political images disseminated by 
the RPF government may be attractive to domestic 
and international audiences, but they mask many 
of the violations and inequalities that blemish the 
Commonwealth’s newest member.
About the author
Jennifer Melvin is a PhD candidate researching post-
genocide reconciliation in Rwanda at the Institute of 
Commonwealth Studies, University of London. She 
holds an MA in Theory and Practice of Human Rights 
from the University of Essex and a BA Honours from 
Queen’s University, Canada. Her research interests 
include human rights, nation-building and identity after 
conflict. 
References
1 Office of the President, ‘Rwanda President Paul Kagame in 
UK for Commonwealth Acceptance’ (8 March 2010), www.
presidency.gov.rw (accessed 10 Jan. 2012). 
2 See Harare Commonwealth Declaration, 1991, 
Commonwealth Heads of Government, www.
thecommonwealth.org/shared_asp_files/GFSR.
asp?NodeID=141095 
3 Paul Kagame became President of the Republic of Rwanda 
in October 2003. He secured a second consecutive term as 
president on 9 August 2010 with a majority of 93 per cent, 
see BBC News, ‘Kagame wins election with 93% of vote’, 11 
Aug. 2010, www.bbc.co.uk/search/news/?q=Kagame%20
Wins%20Election%E2%80%99 (accessed 4 July 2011).  
4 The National Unity and Reconciliation Policy (NURC), 2007. 
5 Paul Collier, Growth Week Conference, London (London 
School of Economics, 21 Sept. 2010).
6 Pronounced ga-cha-cha, Gacaca was traditionally used to 
solve disputes related to land, property and relationships 
in the pre-colonial era. This conflict resolution mechanism 
was re-established by the GNU in 2001 to hear cases of 
the lot of the poor and vulnerable, nor does it alter the 
conditions of structural violence’.40 Uneven development 
has had particularly damaging effects on survivors of 
the genocide as many face extreme poverty, chronic 
housing shortages and trauma.41   
High standards of technocratic governance often 
outweigh good political governance in attracting donor 
interest, as international donors are far less sensitive to 
issues of ‘voice and accountability’ when allocating aid.42 
The readiness of donors to overlook issues of voice and 
accountability takes us back to the relationship between 
reconciliation and development in Rwanda. For instance, 
the RPF has justified the silencing of domestic and 
international NGOs, political opponents and journalists 
as being an appropriate means to eradicate domestic 
divisionism and genocide ideology. The elimination 
of both divisionism and genocide ideology are stated 
goals of the national reconciliation programme, with 
particular reference to the promotion of national unity. 
Impunity, on the other hand, is guaranteed at Gacaca 
and the ICTR for crimes against humanity allegedly 
committed by the RPF in Rwanda. Gacaca, in particular, 
is integrally connected to the promotion of justice 
within the national reconciliation programme and has 
received significant funding and participation from the 
international community with regard to co-ordination 
and monitoring. 
The political image at the centre of the relationship 
between the RPF and the international community of 
donors and investors is one of stability, security and 
strong leadership. Reconciliation has several functions 
within this relationship. The first is to foster a business 
environment that is attractive to donors and investors. 
The second is to provide a framework through which 
donors and NGOs fund and participate in the co-
ordination and monitoring of programmes inside the 
country. The cyclical nature of this relationship supports 
the construction and dissemination of a political image of 
Rwanda and its leadership that promotes development, 
an image overshadowing the negative impacts of the 
national reconciliation programme, namely the silencing 
of opposition and impunity for crimes committed by the 
RPF.  
7Institute of Development Policy and Management, Nov. 
2006): 16.
25 Barbara Oomen, ‘Donor driven justice and its discontents: 
the case of Rwanda’, in Development and Change, 36 vol. 5 
(2005): 895.
26 Ibid, p. 896.
27 Filip Reyntjens, ‘Rwanda, ten years on: from genocide to 
dictatorship’, in African Affairs 103 (2004): 179.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid, p. 199.
30 Johan Pottier, Re-Imagining Rwanda: Conflict, Survival and 
Disinformation in the Late Twentieth Century (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 2002): 156.
31 Ibid. 
32 Some donors withdrew aid in response to the RPF’s 
military incursions in DRC. For instance, in 2004, the UK 
pulled out one quarter of the  general budgetary support 
it had been providing after the RPF announced it was 
considering further military action in DRC. This withdrawal 
was equivalent to 10 per cent of the budget received from 
general budgetary support. Purcell et al. (2006) as cited by 
Eugenia Zorbas, ‘Aid dependence and policy independence: 
explaining the Rwandan paradox’, in (eds.) Straus and 
Waldorf,  Remaking Rwanda: State Building and Human 
Rights after Mass Violence (Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 2011): 112.
33 Kagame, Speech at 15th Commemoration Ceremony of 
Genocide (Kigali, 7 April 2009), www.presidency.gov.rw/
speeches?start=10 (accessed 10 Nov. 2010).
34 The government has criticised the report for ‘rewriting 
history’, reigniting conflict between Rwanda and DRC, 
employing flawed methodology and undermining peace 
and stability in the Great Lakes Region (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Cooperation, Official Government comments, 
30 Sept. 2010); www.gov.rw/IMG/pdf/DRC_Report_
Comments_Rwanda.pdf (accessed 15 Oct. 2010).      
35 Zorbas (2011): 106.
36 Stefaan Marysse et al. (2006): 25.
37 Kagame, Speech at International Peace Institute (New York, 
21 Sept. 2009), www.paulkagame.com/news_main_9.php    
38 Anthony Bebbington, ‘NGOs and uneven development: 
geographies of development intervention’, in Progress in 
Human Geography, 28, vol. 6 (2004): 726.  
39 An Ansoms, Striving for Growth, Bypassing the Poor? A 
Critical Review of Rwanda’s Rural Sector Policies (Antwerp: 
Institute of Development Policy and Management, Nov. 
2007).
40 Eugenia Zorbas (2011): 114.
41 Mary Kayitesi-Blewett, ‘Funding development in Rwanda: 
the survivors’ perspective’, Development in Practice, 16, 3/4 
(June 2006): 320.
42 Kauffman et al. (2005), as quoted in Marysse, et al. (2006): 
26.  
genocide and crimes against humanity allegedly committed 
between 1990 and 1994. Gacaca was set to conclude its 
cases in December 2011. 
7 See Chi Mgbako, ‘Ingando solidarity camps: reconciliation 
and political indoctrination in post-genocide Rwanda’, 
Harvard Human Rights Journal 18 (2005): 217.
8 Dennis Bikesha (Director of Training, Mobilization and 
Sensitization, Gacaca) in discussion with the author, 20 July 
2010.
9 This article does not suggest that the RPF committed 
crimes of genocide. Instead, it discusses the restrictions 
implemented by the RPF to prevent prosecution of crimes 
allegedly committed by individual members before, during 
and after the genocide in Rwanda and DRC.  
10 Lars Waldorf, ‘Rwanda’s failing experiment in restorative 
justice’, in (eds.) Sullivan and Tiffs, Handbook of Restorative 
Justice  (London and New York: Routledge, 2006): 431.
11 These stations and publications were required by 2009 
Media Law to submit a request for an operating permit. See 
Reporters Without Borders, ‘Around 30 news media closed a 
few days ahead of presidential election’, as cited by Timothy 
Longman, ‘Countries at the crossroads 2011 – Rwanda’, 
Freedom House, 10 Nov. 2011. 
12 Amnesty International, ‘Unsafe to speak out: restrictions on 
freedom of expression in Rwanda’ (London: AI Publications, 
June 2011): 5; www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/
AFR47/002/2011/en (accessed 12 Jan. 2012).
13 CHRI, ‘Rwanda’s application for membership in the 
Commonwealth: report and recommendations of the 
Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative’ (New Delhi: CHRI, 
2009): 30; www.humanrightsinitiative.org (accessed 24 
June 2010).
14 CHRI recommended that the Commonwealth Heads 
of Government Meeting make no decision on the 
application until it had examined Rwanda’s eligibility to 
join the Commonwealth and the implications of expanding 
membership. 
15 A copy of this law can be found at www.amategeko.net 
16 Lars Waldorf, ‘Revisiting Hotel Rwanda: genocide ideology, 
reconciliation, and rescuers’, in Journal of Genocide Research 
11: 1 (2009): 109.
17 Amnesty International, Safer to Stay Silent: The Chilling 
Effect of Rwanda’s Laws on ‘Genocide Ideology’ and 
‘Sectarianism’ (London: AI Publications, 2010): 21.
18 Amnesty International (June 2011): 4; www.amnesty.org/
en/library/info/AFR47/005/2010 (accessed 10 Jan. 
2012).
19 Leonard Rugwabiza (Director General of National 
Development Planning and Research at MINECOFIN) in 
discussion with author, 13 July 2010.
20 Ibid.
21 See Government of Rwanda, Vision 2020 (Kigali, 2000) 
www.gesci.org/assets/files/Rwanda_Vision_2020.pdf 
(accessed 8 May 2010). 
22 Kagame, Leadership Summit on Private Equity (speech, 
London, 2 Nov. 2009), www.paulkagame.com/speeches_
main_3.php (accessed 10 Nov. 2010). 
23 Rwanda Vision 2020, p. 8.
24 Stefaan Marysse, et al., The Aid ‘Darlings’ and ‘Orphans’ of 
the Great Lakes Region in Africa, Discussion Paper (Antwerp: 
About the Commonwealth Advisory Bureau
The Commonwealth Advisory Bureau is the independent think-tank and advisory service for the 
modern Commonwealth of fifty-four nations and nearly two billion citizens. We specialise in issues 
of Commonwealth policy including globalisation, democracy, civil society and human rights.
Part of the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, we run projects in countries 
across the Commonwealth. We produce quality policy-relevant reports and briefings to inform and 
influence policy makers in over a quarter of the world’s countries. We seek to put the policy choices 
before the Commonwealth into sharper focus, exploring options and suggesting new directions. 
CA/B projects are changing the way people think on issues such as making elections fairer, 
recognising the needs of indigenous peoples and assisting development in small island states. We 
are committed to continuing our work to inform and improve policy and decision making across 
the Commonwealth.
We also offer confidential and impartial advice to countries interested in applying to join the 
Commonwealth, and can help existing member countries make the most of Commonwealth 
membership for maximum impact at home and abroad.
About the Opinions Series
CA/B Opinions are authored opinion pieces and do not necessarily reflect the views of the CA/B. 
The purpose of the publication series is to stimulate debate and dialogue around some of the most 
pressing issues in the Commonwealth.
